Introspection

I have often called for us Democrats in Nebraska to raise our voices and question what is wrong with our party - why it is that we fail to get Democrats elected almost anywhere but in Lincoln and Omaha. We recently lost one of our 3rd CD representatives to the SCC to the Republican Party. Yesterday, Jim Esch, the CD2 candidate for Congress in 2006 and 2008 left our party. It is time to ask WHY? It is time for us to ask ourselves, as Democrats, who are we, where are we going, and how do we want to get there?

Today I received a very thought provoking email from another good Nebraska Democrat. I like that his analysis reaches into the historical perspective to ascertain what has gone wrong, and what we need to do in order to fix it. I welcome everyone to participate in this discussion, I heartily encourage it. For by sitting on our hands, playing follow the leader, and continuing the path we've been on will guarantee us the same results we've been achieving.

Brian T. Osborn - Chair, Phelps County Democrats

The email I received:

We've often remarked on how the NDP is dysfunctional. As W. Don Nelson likes to say, "beyond dysfunctional." If you accept the premise that a political organization justifies its existence in a democracy by electing its candidates to public office, then the performance of the NDP over the last dozen or so years puts it in the first or second percentile out of the 100+ state organizations in this country.

You can't do that poorly unless there are many serious problems. In fact, it is extremely difficult to have enough problems to fail so spectacularly in accomplishing goals.

But if I had to reduce the problems of the NDP to just one or two fatal flaws, absolute obstacles that prevent success, I would point to the following:

1- In 1960, the Kennedy campaign inaugurated the "battleground states" strategy, the concept that focusing resources on states that were easier to win and ignoring the states that are problematic, was a great way to leverage time and money in a campaign (Nixon, by contrast, campaigned in all fifty states). It worked spectacularly. Although Kennedy barely won the popular vote, he racked up a huge win in the electoral college. Back then, the Democrats had the solid South and could squeeze out the big population Northern states to create landslide potential, bypassing states (like Nebraska) that had the lowest ROI (return on investment). While Kennedy was salting away the presidency, my cousin was being pushed out as the last Democrat to win in the West.

That's the same thing the NDP does. They are derisively characterized as CREOL (Committee to Reelect in Omaha and Lincoln) because they put all their resources into the two population centers -- the low-hanging fruit -- to create a strategy that results in a Tale of Two Cities.

But there are two things wrong with this approach. In the first place, the "battleground" strategy is an electoral college strategy, not a strategy to win the popular vote. Nebraska elections are decided by the popular vote, not by winning just winner-take-all population centers. If the CDs were winner-take-all, like the states in the electoral college, Nebraska's strategy would make sense. But it's not, it's popular vote that counts, and the strategy of conceding 91 rural counties -- essentially half the state -- does not and never will work. The NDP will never win statewide elections until it becomes a statewide party.

Incidentally, Howard Dean showed another flaw in the "battleground states" strategy. It turns out that the lack of attention to some states creates a solid block for the only party that campaigns there. This was not as clear when the South was solid Democratic, but when the South changed parties after the 1964 Civil Rights Act, it became clearer. Howard Dean recognized that in 2004 and began to reform the national Democratic Party to adopt a full fifty-state program -- and the dramatic turnaround in 2006 and 2008 proved that his approach was correct. The "battleground" strategy has been shown to be a short-term strategy that has long-term deleterious consequences. The same in true at the state level. Winning in Lincoln and Omaha cannot in the long-run produce results at the state level -- we need a 93-county strategy (a real one, not a DINO one).

Interestingly, wizards like Achelpohl, who stood to benefit from the fifty-state strategy, were outspoken advocates for that approach at the national level. But Achelpoh never had the brains or insight to realize that what he was so in favor of at the national level, because it generated resources for Nebraska, had a state-level analogue. He just didn't get it.

2- You cannot build a Democratic Party -- a true opposition party -- when the leader of the party finds it inimical to his self-interest to have a Democratic alternative in the state. Ben Nelson calls all the shots. Vic Covalt and Vince Powers work for him. And it is not in his self-interest to have an energized and activist Democratic base, because it is contrary to his electoral strategy.

Nelson's campaign plan is to nail down the Democrats -- as the Party used to take the Solid South for granted -- and then work to win enough Republican and Independent vote to give him a majority. As Don Nelson, his campaign guru, liked to express it, Nelson's battle plan is to get all the Democrats, most of the Independents, and 1/3 of the Republicans. To do that, he will have to go as far to the right as he needs to go to get votes from the cons.

From Nelson's point of view, this strategy has proved to be extremely effective. In 1996, when he was still Governor and extremely popular in Nebraska, he had his drain pan handed to him by Chuck Hagel in his first run for the seat in the Senate vacated by Democratic Senator Exon. In 2000, he ran against Don Stenburg, the AG, (a pretty weak candidate) and won by the razor-thin margin of 10K votes. In 2006, he ran against the well-funded conservative Pete Ricketts, who defeated Stenburg in the primary and then spent $19 million. He started the race up thirty points, won the race by thirty points (and never endorsed a single Democratic candidate). If you look at it strictly from Nelson's point of view, things could not be working better.

The price we pay is suppression of the Democratic base. There has to be a cohesive and uniform subservience of the Dems to the man who supported and voted with George Bush more than any other Democrat in the United States. If there was a vigorous debate in the NDP, there might be a primary challenger than would force Nelson to adopt positions closer to the national party, and this shift would cost him votes in the general against a Republican. His game plan does not want that problem, and the result is that grassroots activism -- the enthusiasm of the base -- is rigorously suppressed.

The effect of putting a lid on Democratic activism is that the entire party, except for Nelson, is completely enervated. All the oxygen is sucked out of the room. You see that in so many ways, not the least of which is the destruction visited on other Democratic candidates (Esch, Hahn, Kleeb) who complain bitterly about their second-class treatment. For example, in 2006, when Nelson was running the so-called combined campaign and Esch was struggling to compete against Terry in CD2, the Party spent most of its money on the DA race in Douglas County -- $20,000. If this had been spent on radio ads for Esch . . . ? No NDP money was given to Kleeb, Hahn or Esch.

If the candidates feel like they are getting screwed -- and they are -- then is it any wonder we have no recruitment? They can see, or at least sense, what is happening. They have no chance to win. This is not a political party, like the one they have in Iowa for example (where the Righties are at least as far out as the cons in Nebraska -- hell, we don't have anyone as far right as Steve King, yet in Iowa they passed a bill permitting gay marriage).

It's a cult of personality, not a political party.